


Geographical and cultural insights into the Episcopal Church and the crisis in the Anglican Communion

Rutherford Cd. Johnson
University of Minnesota, Crookston

ABSTRACT

Tensions and debates that exist within the Episcopal Church and the worldwide Anglican Communion today have much of their roots in the differences between the social and legal paradigms of the United States and Great Britain. Also contributory are differences that exist between different parts of the United States. The religious diversity during the colonial era stemming in part from the influences of the various Colonial powers, philosophies spawning the American War of Independence, and the expansion of religious diversity after the creation of the American Republic all contributed to the different structures and beliefs within not only American religion in general, but also within American Anglicanism. This study uses geospatial analysis to investigate these differences and, combined with background information, provide insight into the underlying causes of the ongoing debates, disputes, and divisions within the Anglican Communion.

Keywords: GIS, Culture, Religion, ArcMap, Socio-Legal Analysis



Copyright statement: Authors retain the copyright to the manuscripts published in AABRI journals. Please see the AABRI Copyright Policy at <http://www.aabri.com/copyright.html>

INTRODUCTION

The differences in legal framework and social paradigm between the Episcopal Church of the United States of America (ECUSA) and the Church of England underlie much of the ongoing tension and conflict within the Anglican Communion today. These differences also contribute causally to the response of clergy and laity to the issues facing that Communion. For example, the separation of some bishops, clerics, and laymen from ECUSA in the 1970s and the formation of new provincial governments could be reasonably said to be a logical extension of the legal structure of the Episcopal Church going back to its very inception and its roots in the British American colonies. Where the Church of England is highly centralized, the Episcopal Church emphasizes more local governance.

Indeed, it could be said that what is sometimes termed “Americanism” in religion was simply an outgrowth of the prevalent belief that the United States was founded to establish religious freedom that did not exist in Europe.¹ Yet, the validity of that belief varied and varies by geographical location. While motives of religious freedom could be said with confidence about the early settlers in parts of New England, economic opportunity and a sense of adventure could just as easily be said to be the primary reason for colonists in certain other British colonies. Spanish and French colonies were clearly Roman Catholic until certain parts, such as West Florida on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, were taken by the British. From then on the religious composition was mixed, but still of different composition than in the colonies that had been founded by or had become predominantly British or of the Protestant Netherlands.

Differences among Protestants existed just as much within the colonies as religious differences existed in Europe. Baptists and Anglicans often were at odds. Puritans did not always agree, as the founding of Rhode Island as an offshoot of the Massachusetts Bay Colony attests. Catholics, who were supposed to be at peace in Maryland found themselves literally at war with Protestants in bloody military conflicts such as the Battle of the Severn. The Catholics there lost both physical ground and the freedom they sought. Effective state religions existed during the Colonial period and even to some extent remained after the establishment of the American Republic. Only slowly did they disappear. For example, laws banning religious attire, targeting the influence of Catholic priests in public school systems, remained well into the twenty-first century. Such laws currently exist only in two states.

From the Colonial period and into the current republic, religious belief in what is now the United States of America varied and varies by location. Sometimes these geographical differences can be quite dramatic. Florida, for example, is historically Catholic, but is adjacent to predominantly-Protestant Alabama. Within Alabama, however, Mobile and Baldwin Counties on the Gulf are historically Catholic due to the French and Spanish in the Colonial era.

A thorough understanding of the geographic distribution of church polity and socio-legal philosophy is useful to understanding the complex issues facing the Anglican Communion. So many religious issues in the United States today track with geography. It also factors heavily into political elections, the results of which follow geographical order (Knickerbocker, 2014).

This study seeks to investigate spatial relationships between ecclesiology and location in order to provide insight into the underlying issues contributing to the crises facing the Anglican Communion and the Episcopal Church of the United States today (Rubenstein, 2011). Because of the origins of the Church of England in the Roman Catholic Church and the similar issues

¹ For more on the issue of religious freedom in the American colonies, see Lambert, Frank. *The Founding Fathers and the Place of Religion in America*. Princeton. 2003.

historically and currently faced by the Roman Communion, particularly in the United States, this study will also incorporate the Roman perspective in background for insight, comparison, and completeness.

This study seeks to provide insight into the ongoing Anglican crisis, chiefly that part taking place in the Episcopal Church, through the exploration of historical factors leading to differences between the American form of Anglicanism and geographical variation in belief and action within the United States.

BACKGROUND

The Church of England retains much of the central hierarchical organization of the Roman Church from whence it came. In marked contrast to the Church of England, Bishops of the Episcopal Church ultimately answer to no higher ecclesiastical authority, even though they are part of the Anglican Communion.² The Church of England has the offices of Primate, Metropolitan, and Archbishop, while the Episcopal Church has no such offices³. The Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church, though possessing of certain diverse trappings of an archbishop, nevertheless does not make use of the title and also does not hold Metropolitan authority. This is not surprising for a church whose structure, despite its origins in the Church of England, was essentially born out of the American War of Independence and the resulting American Republic.

The medieval Church effectively functioned as a monopoly, with all the advantages that a monopoly entails (Ekelund et al., 1996). Once the Church of England became a separate entity from the Roman Church, it still had many of the same monopolistic advantages as the established church (Podmore, 2008). It retained features of church order consistent with those prior to the Reformation (McClellan, 2008). In the British American Colonies, however, that effective monopoly did not universally exist. Colonies such as South Carolina and Virginia were heavily Anglican. However, the Puritan areas, such as in New England, were hostile to the Anglicans, as were the Quakers. Attempts by Colonial government authorities to regulate religion varied by time and space. One example took place in the 17th century. Landgrave Robert Daniell, Deputy Governor of North Carolina at the time, attempted to require a profession of Anglicanism for those who would hold public office. This was a most unpopular measure with the Quaker and non-Anglican population. Ultimately the attempt failed.

With several European powers colonizing what became the United States, it is not surprising that many different cultural frameworks (which include aspects of society, government, religion, and law) were transmitted to the New World through migration. Rather than simply being extensions of the European homeland, though, the New World territories became amalgamations. Territory changed hands, often several times. What once was Dutch and became British, for example, saw some Dutch remaining in a newly-British environment and implanted British in an area that has a Dutch footprint. It was also difficult to entice French Protestants to emigrate to the Virginia Colony in the 17th century because they found it far too foreign. It was not until the establishment of the Mannekin settlement in Virginia at the turn of the 18th century that French Protestants began to migrate in larger numbers there, for Mannekin was built intentionally according to French custom. Newer arrivals to an area bring their cultural

² The Anglican Communion is a worldwide organization of Anglican Churches that are all both in communion with each other and with the Archbishop of Canterbury, Primate of All England.

³ The Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church is, however, considered of equivalent rank of Primate for the purpose of participation in the Primates' Meeting.

framework, but live in the environment they enter. They both influence the environment they enter and are influenced by it (Fernandez and Fogli, 2009). Adaptation of individuals and customs can take time, and the transition can sometimes cause discontentment (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009). Discontentment, particularly in the American context, quite often leads to change – change of laws, change of customs, change of beliefs. This can spur new organizations and influence existing ones. The broad realm of religion in practice is no exception to this phenomenon.

Quite a few denominations (to use the going word) existed within the Colonies (though not as many as today), creating what could legitimately be termed a basic “marketplace” of churches. These denominations developed their characters, structures, and beliefs in part due to economic shifters (Ekelund et al., 2006). In America, religion was moving from being a public utility to a matter of market choice (Davie, 2013).

With the creation of the United States, religion was formally disestablished. Yet, as mentioned, some states had *de facto* state churches, and at the very least some churches were clearly favored over others. Certainly longevity with a particular religious organization can result in more loyalty and more partisanship against other religious organizations (Converse, 1969). Additionally, the longer groups have been in conflict, the more emotional forces there are perpetuating the rivalry (Abbink et al., 2010). That notwithstanding, the disestablishment of religion furthered and expanded the marketplace of available churches. Although there is a strong correlation, even today, between the religious choices of children and the religious choices of their parents, the increase of alternatives and the admittedly partial removal of barriers, and intercultural and interdenominational marriages resulted in more religious/denominational diversification (Bisen and Verdier, 2000). Citizens of the new republic could choose between Anglicanism, Methodism, Presbyterianism, Anabaptists, Baptists, Puritans, Congregationalists, and so forth. New denominations sprung up over time, the most famous of which perhaps is the uniquely-American Mormon Church. The personal traits of those promoting or endorsing those religious movements contributed to shifts in denominational choice, much like celebrity endorsers in the marketplace for goods and services. That is, people overall have more faith in products, activities, or organizations that are affiliated with people we trust, admire, or want to emulate (Kyung et al., 2011). If an individual’s choice in the religious marketplace results in cognitive dissonance due to an inconsistency between that choice and the individual’s internal beliefs, the individual may change beliefs to be consistent with religious choice to alleviate discomfort by removing the inconsistency (Mullainathan and Washington, 2009). Thus the presence of the religious marketplace itself, in as much as it causes individuals to make a denominational choice, can be a driving factor in individual adaptation of religious belief.

Anglicanism as a whole also has a propensity to adapt to its local environment (Forster, 2005). Canon law is no exception, and it may easily vary with locality (Hill, 2012). Within the new framework of the American Republic, the successor of the Church of England in America, i.e., the Episcopal Church, became a competitor in the religious marketplace. Where it had been the favored church, it was no longer – at least not officially. Where it had not been favored, it could now compete. Capitalism contributed to the modification of the face and indeed the essence of churches in the U.S. as they responded to the changing wants, needs, and desires of their congregation over time. It became all too easy in America for individuals to change churches as quickly as they might change consumer brands, thereby requiring churches, particularly Protestant ones, to have to at least consider changing their presentation or even their

doctrine in order to prevent congregational loss. Furthermore, insofar as different ecclesiastical organizations may look similar or adopt similar beliefs or practices in an effort to compete, there existed and exists the possibility of choosing due to such similarity with other ecclesiastical organizations that have greater familiarity. This potential increases with the number of poor and/or poorly-educated people, and with the number of alternative church choices, both of which vary spatially (Shue and Luttimer, 2009). Where the Roman Church traditionally sought to seek “product purity,” the Protestant Reformation responded to the wishes of the wealthy and the economically-up-and-coming against the Roman monopoly (Shue and Luttimer, 2009; Ekelund and Tollison, 2011).

The American framework of religion is an extension and even perhaps an exaggeration of the philosophy of the Protestant Reformation, both in terms of doctrine and church polity (Doe, 2013). The traditional Christian model is one of personal responsibility within the framework of Christian doctrine and law. The “capitalist” model that arguably grew out of the Protestant Reformation, however, has a fundamental assumption that the individual knows best (Weber, 1905)⁴. Capitalism is itself a form of belief system that has sometimes become melded together, particularly in the United States, with Protestant Christianity (Tanner, 2010). Capitalism is also the de facto religion for some otherwise non-religious individuals, where currency becomes their source of “divine light.” Yet individual self-interest as an economic model is an idea that is foreign to traditional Christianity, including the Church of England (Williams, 2010).

In the Anglican case of “consumer” choice in the United States, as individual bishops, priests, deacons, and laymen of the Episcopal Church have complaints of whatever kind with something in the Episcopal Church or the Anglican Communion, some simply choose to raise the drawbridge and form their own new ecclesiastical government and denominational structure.⁵ This occurred in the 1970s in particularly dramatic form as the “Continuing Anglican”⁶ movement began in opposition to the ordination of women in the Episcopal Church, the 1979 Book of Common Prayer, and other issues. No sooner had this happened than the Continuing Anglican movement itself began to suffer division. One group became two. Two became four, and so on. The reasons for these splits varied. Some wanted Morning Prayer on Sundays, while those favoring the Oxford Movement wanted mass every Sunday if not more often. Some were very similar to Tridentine Roman Rite parishes, while others found anything that was too “Roman” or too “Popish” to be thoroughly offensive.

Continuing Anglican churches in the United States quickly became highly democratic entities at the parochial, diocesan, and provincial levels, much like the very church that they left; in some cases, even more so. This no doubt was adopted as a matter of survival in an attempt to try to balance the various competing interests, goals, plans, and desires of their constituency. Ironically, some Continuing Anglican churches even began to ordain women – one of the most prominent issues at the root of the formation of the Continuing Anglican movement.

⁴ Left to itself, the ideal market is believed to be such that it will automatically achieve, without need of outside agency, the economically efficient outcome. Individuals acting in their own self-interest is a major driving force.

⁵ These denominations may still incorporate the words “Anglican” and/or “Episcopal,” even though they are separate legal entities.

⁶ The name “Continuing Anglican” derives from the common belief by at least some of these organizations that they are the continuation of true and authentic Anglicanism. The numerically-superior entity they left, on the other hand, considered them schismatic. In religion, numerical superiority does not inherently guarantee correctness any more than it is inherently wrong. The theological question of who is right and who is wrong, however, is beyond the scope of the present study.

The issues that led to schism in the Episcopal Church, then, were not likely truly rooted overall in canon law or ecclesiastical structure. If they were, then logic would suggest that very different governments may have resulted as the continuing Anglican movement began and developed. The movement as a whole was content to maintain the same basic system as the Episcopal Church had or even become more democratic. Authority in American churches follows the belief that authority derives from the consent of the governed and not from God, even in the Church (Podmore, 2008). Canon law of the Continuing Anglican church is typically much closer to that of the Episcopal Church than to the Church of England or the Roman Communion. It is somewhat similar to the creation of new colonies by members of other American colonies, or of new territories (and eventual states) in the United States by citizens of other states. The government structure of the new colony or territory tended to resemble that of the colony or State that they left rather than the government of Great Britain or other European monarchies.

Some who have left the Episcopal Church actually desired, like the famous Anglican convert in England, John Henry Cardinal Newman, more Catholicity⁷ and hierarchical structure common to the historic and traditional Church prior to the Protestant Reformation. Some of those took advantage of the Pastoral Provision of Pope John Paul II to join the Roman Communion. It was, of course, possible for Anglicans to become Roman Catholic before that. Cardinal Newman is certainly one such example. The Pastoral Provision, however, provided a mechanism for conversion, both individually and by group, and permitted its members to retain Anglican-style liturgy. The Pastoral Provision created “Anglican Use” parishes within the Latin Rite of the Roman Communion. Despite having their own distinct liturgy, these parishes were (and are, for they still exist) otherwise like any other parish in the Catholic diocese in which they reside and subject to the Bishop Ordinary, Metropolitan, and Pope. Benedict XVI furthered this concept with the establishment of the Anglican Ordinariates in 2009.⁸ These ecclesiastical entities are “Anglican Use” in terms of patrimony and liturgy, but under the leadership of an Ordinary, who is either a bishop or a priest and is appointed to lead the Ordinariate parishes within a specific large geographical area spanning the territory of several regular dioceses.⁹ Parish councils exist in Anglican Use and Anglican Ordinariate parishes, but they do not have the same statutory authority under canon law that a Vestry in the Episcopal Church has.

Others who left the Episcopal Church became Old Roman Catholic or Old Catholic, such as former Episcopal Bishop William Brown. Both Old Roman Catholicism and Old Catholicism

⁷ In its Roman sense.

⁸ The Ordinariates were established 4 November 2009 with the Apostolic Constitution entitled *Anglicanorum Coetibus*. The Personal Ordinariate of Our Lady of Walsingham was established under this Constitution in the United Kingdom on 15 January 2011. The Personal Ordinariate of the Chair of Saint Peter was established in the United States on 1 January 2012. The Personal Ordinariate of Our Lady of the Southern Cross was established in Australia on 15 June 2012.

⁹ Under the Apostolic Constitution *Anglicanorum Coetibus*, the Ordinary may be consecrated a bishop if he is unmarried. Otherwise he is made a prelate and given the office of Priest Ordinary. The latter is very similar to the position of a Prelate Nullius and has virtually all the external symbology of a Bishop. Though some Catholic priests are married, particularly in the Anglican Ordinariate, and although there is no doctrinal prohibition on married bishops, canon law since 1145 typically prevents it. Dispensations may be granted, such as in the case of Bishop Salomão Farraz, who was consecrated in the lines of Duarte-Costa. He was received without consecration, either *sub-conditione* or *de novo*, into the Roman Communion as a Bishop while he was still married. Also, while still married, he was appointed to a committee of the Second Vatican Council by Pope Paul VI. However, in the Ordinariates, the Apostolic Constitution governing them requires the Ordinary to be a priest if married and is eligible to be a Bishop only if unmarried or, presumably with a Papal dispensation.

descend from the ancient Catholic diocese of Utrecht in the modern-day Netherlands (Engelhardt, 2014). Some Old Catholic jurisdictions, including the present Old Catholic See of Utrecht¹⁰, have intercommunion with the Anglican Communion. The Old Catholic See of Utrecht seeks not just intercommunion but eventual union with the Anglican Communion into one single church (Engelhardt, 2014). Thus some who chose this route maintained a direct link with the very communion they left. Even those who are not in the Utrecht Union of Old Catholic Churches maintain somewhat of a link, even if only spiritual and/or historical. Still others, however, went to Orthodoxy. Still others became general Protestant, such as Methodist or Baptist. Presumably some also gave up on religion altogether.

Whether leaving a denomination or not, the “marketplace choice” in American religion is not a single-choice decision. Some who left the Episcopal Church and originally participated in the Continuing Anglican movement eventually left that movement to become Roman Catholic, general Protestant, Old Roman Catholic, Old Catholic, Orthodox, etc. Some even returned to the Episcopal Church. Religious choice in the United States is so often very individual and fluid.

The described phenomena in post-independence America are not limited to the Episcopal Church. The Roman Church in the United States also began to experience problems of decentralized governance¹¹. This became so pronounced that Pope Leo XIII issued an encyclical to the Archbishop of Baltimore¹² condemning what was termed the heresy of “Americanism.” The specific issue at hand was the notion that the church in different geographical locations were justified in modifying policies, procedures, and doctrine to fit that location. Leo naturally opposed this, confirming Rome’s position that the church is universal and doctrine does not change with geography. While that is the historic position of the church, there was a mismatch with popular sentiment in the United States that continues to this day.

In 2011, in preparation for the 2012 Presidential election in which Paul Ryan, a Roman Catholic, was the Republican Vice Presidential candidate, an article in the *National Catholic Reporter* said:

“From liberals to centrists to conservatives, there is a cult of individualism that pervades American life. This individualism, which is rooted in various atheist philosophies and Protestant theologies, is entirely incompatible with Catholic social thought” (Christian, 2011).

Various leaders of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops have echoed this sentiment. For example, Cardinal George, the Archbishop of Chicago, stated during the Gardener Lecture in Moral Theology in 2013:

¹⁰ There is also now a parallel Diocese of Utrecht established by Rome in addition to the historic one. This derives from tensions that arose between Utrecht and Rome, particularly in the 18th century, and are beyond the intended scope of this study.

¹¹ While acknowledging that not everyone, whether within or without the Catholic Church, may see this issue of decentralized governance as a problem, it is so indicated here as a matter of consistency with the perspective of the Catholic Church itself and her laws. From the standpoint of logic, if any church or indeed any organization prefers, by law or tradition, a more centralized form of government, moves towards decentralization may reasonably be considered to be viewed as both inconsistent with internal standards and problematic by that church or organization.

¹² Although the United States does not have an official Primate, the Archbishop of Baltimore is traditionally considered the unofficial or *de facto* Primate. Nevertheless, he has no Primatial authority.

“Individualism is an American virtue,” the Cardinal said. “There are a lot of good things about individualism. But in the United States, the biggest obstacle to the Church is individualism.”¹³

In the Roman custom, individualism, at least when it comes to religion, is viewed primarily as something negative and an hindrance to the faith. Within Anglican custom, particularly in America, individualism does not have such a negative stigma. There may be social and peer pressure, but American Anglicanism is far more similar to mainstream American Protestantism in terms of religion as an individual experience. Within the Episcopal Church and even within many continuing Anglican bodies, individual belief can influence the entire organization, resulting in shifts in doctrine, theology, and polity.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

A geospatial empirical model in the study was constructed to investigate an Anglican shift away from the Episcopal Church at the state level as a function of various explanatory variables within those states. Across all fifty states and the District of Columbia in the USA, the number of Anglican Church in North America (ACNA) parishes in a given state was used as the dependent variable to represent those who left the Episcopal Church in favor of the Continuing Anglican movement or at least opted for the Continuing Anglican movement in the first instance without having been a member of the Episcopal Church. ACNA parishes were used for this purpose because it is a relatively large organization among Continuing Anglicans, it openly provides data on parish numbers and locations, it represents the most recent and arguably most contentious and dramatic split with the Episcopal Church, and other Continuing Anglican jurisdictions formally joined ACNA. For the last reason, the use of ACNA as a metric helps to prevent double counting that might occur if other organizations that eventually joined ACNA, in whole or in part, were included. Additionally, there is talk of the feasibility of ACNA joining the Anglican Communion, creating overlapping territorial jurisdictions within that communion (Hill, 2012).

The individual choice being examined in the model is the choice between Anglican (Episcopal Church) and Anglican (non-Episcopal Church). See Fig. 2 for the distribution of ACNA parishes in the United States. The three categories of parish numbers were determined according to statistical natural breaks calculated within ESRI ArcMap.

The first explanatory variable is a state “conservatism” ranking. Much of today’s discourse in the crises facing the Episcopal Church and the Anglican Communion as a whole center on the very broad notion of conservatism. The conservatism ranking was derived from a Gallup Poll conducted in 2014, which provided state-level percentages of those who self-identify as “Conservative,” “Moderate,” and “Liberal.” To remove correlation within the data, a single variable was constructed based on the relative order of the three percentages in a given state. The values of that variable are “conservative,” “moderately-conservative,” “moderate,” “moderately-liberal,” and “liberal,” with numerical values of 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, and 3 respectively.

Fig. 2 shows the distribution of conservatism in the United States. No states fell in the purely “moderate” category based on the single constructed conservatism variable. Only one was purely liberal, viz. the District of Columbia. Massachusetts, Vermont, and Hawaii were

¹³ The annual Gardener Lecture in Moral Theology was held 3 May 2013 at Mount St. Mary’s Seminary of the West in Ohio.

“moderately-liberal.” The conservative states were largely grouped together in the southeast and much of the midwest and central states. Moderately-conservative states were found in the west, northeast, and parts of the midwest.

The second explanatory variable is the number of Episcopal Church parishes in each state. See Fig. 3 for the distribution of parishes by state. Some of the same states, i.e., California, Texas, Florida, Virginia, and Pennsylvania have the highest concentrations of both ACNA and Episcopal Church parishes. Illinois and South Carolina are also in the highest concentration category of ACNA parishes. However, Illinois is in the middle category of Episcopal Church parish count, while South Carolina is in the lowest category. Also, New York has the highest concentration of Episcopal Church parishes, while it is in the middle category of ACNA parishes. Much of the remainder of the country is shown to be identical in terms of parish count category, with a few exceptions, particularly in Washington State, Colorado, and parts of the midwest.

The legality of same-sex marriage under civil law, without entering into theological debate or canon law, was also considered as an explanatory variable due to that issue being at the center of much of the debate between the Episcopal Church and various Continuing Anglicans, as well as within the Episcopal Church itself. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, conflicts have arisen between religious institutions and proponents of same-sex marriage or unions. This is often played out in civil courts (Leigh, 2008). In both countries, a balance between decisions reached under civil law and the religious freedom of those who cannot participate in such ceremonies under canon law has been sought (Ahdar, 2014). However, because a variable indicating the legality of same-sex marriage prior to the 2015 Supreme Court decision, whether by legislation or judicial act, would necessarily be a dummy variable, i.e., with a value of 0 or 1, this variable was not included. In a geographical model, dummy variables, with their “either/or” nature, simply represent geographical areas rather than differentiating characteristics of those geographical areas, and are hence typically to be avoided. Eight states (Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) have passed legislation authorizing same-sex marriage, and three states (Maine, Maryland, and Washington) have authorized it through popular vote. Twenty-six states have some form of legalized same-sex marriage due to a court ruling. The matter was apparently settled in U.S. civil law by the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court this year to legalize same-sex marriage. That, however, has neither ended the debate nor ended the legal and legislative challenges.

The number of parishes of the Anglican Ordinariate comprised another variable, as the Ordinariate is one of the chief substitutes within the broad heading of “entities possessing Anglican patrimony” for both the Episcopal Church and the Continuing Anglican movement. Population was also included as an explanatory variable in order to account for any potential population effects.

A geographically weighted regression was performed in ArcMap in order to explore two primary areas of investigation. The first is if and how the chosen explanatory variables explain the variation in number of continuing Anglican parishes (proxied by number of ACNA parishes) across the fifty states and the District of Columbia. The second is to see which states, if any, deviate from the model in terms of predicted vs. actual/observed numbers of parishes. Where the model overpredicts, there are fewer ACNA parishes than expected. Where the model underpredicts, there are more ACNA parishes than expected. In those geographical areas, other factors not included in the model are likely contributing to the ACNA parish numbers. This

information provides insight into the geographically-distributed internal variability within American Anglicanism. This helps not only in terms of understanding the ongoing situations, but by suggesting areas that warrant further exploration.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The geographically weighted regression had an R^2 value of 78% and an adjusted R^2 of 76%. (See Table 1.) This is believed to be reasonable, considering the geographical diversity, state-level data, and the real potential for other factors that might impact the number of ACNA that were not included in the four variables of available data in the model. The regression results are provided in Table 1 and depicted in Fig. 4.

The number of Episcopal Church parishes was not a statistically significant variable in predicting the number of ACNA parishes. Somewhat surprisingly, the conservative ranking variable was also statistically insignificant. However, since that variable was based on a survey of a random sample of the U.S. population as a whole, of which Anglicans are a small part, this is not an illogical result. Also, the conservative ranking in the survey captured general philosophy and not necessarily purely religious philosophy. While religion can influence political and social philosophy of individuals, secularism has increased in the United States, and thus it is reasonable to expect that an individual's stated level of conservatism or liberalism may be determined even in the absence of any significant religious belief. With specific regard to the questions of this study, the results suggest that the participation of individuals with continuing/conservative Anglicanism in a given state is determined independently from the overall conservatism of that state. That is to say that the growth or decline of continuing Anglicanism in a given state is more a matter of individual belief and/or desire and less a product of influence from the surrounding population. This is further supported by the fact that the number of Episcopal Church parishes was also not statistically significant in determining the number of ACNA parishes. That may be due in part to individuals leaving the Episcopal Church to form one or more new parishes outside the Episcopal Church, while the Episcopal parish that they left still remains a parish within the Episcopal Church. Also, individuals from multiple Episcopal Church parishes may leave those parishes to form a single new continuing Anglican parish. Other possibilities certainly exist. In any case, the phenomenon appears to be one of individual action, however, rather than parish action. Reasons for this include canon law preventing a parish from leaving and/or taking property without permission of the Bishop, insufficient members in a parish voting to leave *en masse*, and simple individual choice within the "Marketplace of Denominations" in the United States.

A higher number of Anglican Ordinariate parishes is correlated with a higher number of ACNA parishes. At first glance, since ACNA and the Ordinariate are both substitutes for the Episcopal Church and both associated with religious conservatism, this is a somewhat surprising result. However, this result suggests that those Anglicans who leave the Episcopal Church for ACNA are different from those who leave for the Ordinariate. In general, leaving the Episcopal Church for a continuing Anglican jurisdiction (including ACNA, the proxy for continuing Anglican churches in this study) allows individuals to continue many of the same post-Reformation Anglican beliefs and polity. Those who join the Ordinariate, however, necessarily must accept the primacy of Rome and are administratively under the jurisdiction of the Papacy. Furthermore, there is a wide variety of belief on core issues within the continuing Anglican movement and even within ACNA. Joining the Ordinariate requires much more acceptance (or at

least tolerance) of a single set of core beliefs that many in Anglicanism find difficult to accept at best. Even where there is agreement on many of the fundamental Catholic doctrines, there still exist Anglicans who wish to remain separate from Rome and Anglicans who fully embrace the Papacy.

For each state, the predicted value of ACNA parishes based on the estimated model was compared to the actual/observed number of ACNA parishes in that state. For those states in which the predicted value of ACNA parishes was within 1.5 standard deviations in either direction of the actual value, the predicted and actual values were considered to be statistically “equal.” If the model predicted a number of ACNA parishes that was *more* than 1.5 standard deviations from the actual value, the model is said to be overpredicted. If the model predicted a number of ACNA parishes that was *less* than 1.5 standard deviations from the actual value, the model is said to be underpredicted. There were five states (Texas, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina) that were underpredicted, i.e., there were more ACNA parishes in the state than the model predicted. For only three states (California, New York, and Maryland), the model overpredicted, i.e., there were fewer ACNA parishes than the model predicted.

In those eight states in which the model underpredicted or overpredicted the number of ACNA parishes, more exploration is needed to determine the root determining factors. Where there are more ACNA parishes than expected, it could be due to more individualism and the potential for more jurisdictional splitting. Where there are fewer, it could be due to something as simple as higher property expense making additional parishes less feasible. California, New York, and Maryland certainly have high property value, but then so does Illinois, where the model underpredicted, and many other states where the model was equal. It could also be that in the states in which the model underpredicted individuals are more likely to “vote with their feet” over a disagreement, while in those states in which the model overpredicted, individuals are more likely to seek a resolution within the Episcopal Church rather than leaving. Some individuals, particularly those whose families have been Episcopalian for generations, are unwilling to leave the institution. That is especially true in old Colonial areas. However, three of the five states in which the model underpredicted and two of the three states in which the model overpredicted are old Colonial areas. In Texas, an entire diocese left the Episcopal Church *en masse* and joined ACNA, resulting in ongoing litigation. That may also be a contributing factor, at least in that state. These are mere educated speculations and possible avenues of further investigation. The true and complete answer to the question of those eight states may easily be something else entirely.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has sought to provide insight into the ongoing Anglican crisis, particularly in the Episcopal Church, by first exploring the historical factors leading to differences between the American form of Anglicanism and then expanding to explore the geographical variation in belief and action within the United States. The results of the statistical analysis help to underscore the diversity of religious viewpoint in America and the complexity of that diversity. While American Anglicanism is different from that in the Church of England, there is further great diversity within American Anglicanism. This knowledge is crucial to furthering the understanding of the crisis within the Anglican Communion – particularly the part of that crisis involving the Episcopal Church. The significant denominational diversity within the American colonies from its earliest days, the varying degrees of tolerance between denominations, and the

increase of diversity with the establishment of the United States has created an intricate and multifaceted religious dynamic. This dynamic has contributed to the shaping of American law and even internal church structure in American denominations. As these influences vary by state, geographical locations each take on their own unique identity. Yet those identities are ever-changing and evolving as time passes and both people and ideas migrate.

Within the Episcopal Church, lines have been drawn. These may be somewhat fluid lines, but they are lines nonetheless. The establishment of ACNA has resulted in perhaps the largest split in the history of the Anglican Communion to date. Some who had previously left the Episcopal Church to join or establish new independent Anglican jurisdictions allied themselves with ACNA. There is much contentiousness on both sides, with certain issues often being resolved in the civil courts.¹⁴ Texas is one of the biggest battlegrounds, but it is by no means the only one.

Despite overall American principles of law, civil law nonetheless varies by state, county, and municipality. These variations largely reflect differences between the history of those areas and between the people. Within American Anglicanism, canon law is often no different. There are Canons of the Episcopal Church, but their applicability and enforceability is questionable. In the Episcopal Church, it is ultimately the individual Bishops that make the law for their own dioceses. What is permitted in one diocese may not be permitted in another. These geographic variations in ecclesial polity and law have no doubt contributed to the crisis. That is not to say that they are the cause of the crisis. That is beyond the scope of this study. However, the differences are quite likely part of the answer as to how the current situation has played out and is continuing the play out.

Geospatial analysis of culture, religious belief, politics, church polity, and law are undoubtedly valuable for understanding the ongoing situation in the Anglican Communion. A better understanding of the people involved is beneficial to church policymakers in reaching the best possible outcome.

¹⁴ Civil courts in the U.S. cannot interfere in religious matters. However, where they do become involved, there tends to be an overlapping civil issue, such as employment rights or property disputes. Even there, though, much attention is paid to the church's own laws, structure, and polity.

REFERENCES

- Abbink, Klaus; Jordi Brandts; Benedikt Herrmann; and Henrik Orzen. "Intergroup Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game." *The American Economic Review*. Vol. 100. No. 1. March, 2010.
- Ahdar, Rex. "Solemnisation of Same Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom." *Ecclesiastical Law Journal*. Vol. 16. No. 3. September 2014.
- Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier. "'Beyond the Melting Pot': Cultural Transmission, Marriage, and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 2000.
- Christian, Robert. "Catholic Social Teaching vs. the Cult of American Individualism." *National Catholic Register*. 5 July 2011.
- Converse, Philip E. "Of Time and Partisan Stability." *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 2. No. 2. 1969.
- Davie, Grace. "Belief and Unbelief: Two sides of a Coin." *Ecclesiastical Law Journal*. Vol. 15. No. 3. September 2013.
- Doe, N. *Christian Law*. Cambridge University Press. 2013.
- Ekelund, Robert B.; Robert F. Hebert; Robert D. Tollison; Gary M. Anderson; Audrey B. Davidson. *Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm*. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1996.
- Ekelund, Robert B.; Robert F. Hebert; and Robert D. Tollison. *Marketplace of Christianity*. MIT Press. 2006.
- Ekelund, Robert B. and Robert D. Tollison. *Economic Origins of Roman Christianity*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago. 2011.
- Engelhardt, Hanns. "The Constitution of the Anglican Church in Aotearoa, New Zealand, and Polynesia: A Model for Europe?" *Ecclesiastical Law Journal*. Vol. 16. No. 3. September, 2014.
- Fernandez, Raquel and Alessandra Fogli. "Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs, Work, and Fertility." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*. Vol. 1. No. 1. January, 2009.
- Forster, Peter. "The Significance of the Declaration of Assent." *Ecclesiastical Law Journal*. Vol. 8. No. 37. July, 2005.
- Guriev, Sergei and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. "(Un)Happiness in Transition." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. Vol. 23. No. 2. Spring, 2009.
- Hill, Christopher. "Ecclesiological and Canonical Observations on *The Principles of Canon Law Common to the Churches of the Anglican Communion*." *Ecclesiastical Law Journal*. Vol. 14. No. 3. September, 2012.
- Knickerbocker, Brad. "How religion in the US today tracks closely with geography." *The Christian Science Monitor*. 8 February 2014.
- Kyung, Hobin; Ohyoon Kwon, and Yongjun Sung. "The Effects of Spokes-Characters' Personalities of Food Products on Source Credibility." *Journal of Food Products Marketing*. Vol. 17. No. 1. January-February 2011.
- Leigh, Ian. "Hatred, Sexual Orientation, Free Speech, and Religious Liberty." *Ecclesiastical Law Journal*. Vol. 10. No. 3. September, 2008.
- McClean, David. "The Legal Background." Taken from "In the Service of the Saints': In Consideration of the Draft Ecclesiastical Offices (Terms of Service) Measure." Papers

- from the Ecclesiastical Law Society Conference, March 2008. *Ecclesiastical Law Journal*. Vol. 10. No. 3. September 2008.
- Mullainathan, Sendhil and Ebonya Washington. "Sticking with Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance and Political Attitudes." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*. Vol. 1. No. 1. January, 2009.
- Podmore, Colin. "A Tale of Two Churches: The Ecclesiologies of The Episcopal Church and the Church of England Compared." *The Ecclesiastical Law Journal*. Cambridge University Press. Vol. 10. No. 1. January 2008.
- Rubenstein, James M. *The Cultural Landscape: An Introduction to Human Geography*. Prentice Hall. 2011.
- Shue, Kelly and Enzo F. P. Luttimer. "Who Misvotes? The Effect of Differential Cognition Costs on Election Outcomes." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*. Vol. 1. No. 1. February 2009.
- Tanner, Kathryn. "Is Capitalism a Belief System?" *The Anglican Theological Review*. Vol. 92. No. 4. Fall, 2010.
- Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. 1904.
- Williams, Rowan. "Theology and Economics: Two Different Worlds?" *The Anglican Theological Review*. Vol. 92. No. 4. Fall, 2010.




Figure 1.





Figure 2.




Figure 3.




Figure 4.





Table 1. Geographical Weighted Regression Results

STATE	R ²	OBS.	PRED.	Coefficients									
				INT.	<i>t-val.</i>	POP	<i>t-val.</i>	CONS	<i>t-val.</i>	ORD	<i>t-val.</i>	ECUSA	<i>t-val.</i>
Alabama	0.78	14.00	19.49	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Alaska	0.78	0.00	2.52	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Arizona	0.78	12.00	23.34	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Arkansas	0.78	10.00	7.64	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
California	0.78	89.00	100.94	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Colorado	0.78	21.00	12.17	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Connecticut	0.78	7.00	7.22	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Delaware	0.78	3.00	2.53	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Dist.Columbia	0.78	4.00	0.18	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Florida	0.78	56.00	66.34	2.50	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Georgia	0.78	36.00	30.67	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Hawaii	0.78	1.00	2.50	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.15	3.98	-0.01	-0.43
Idaho	0.78	3.00	4.70	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Illinois	0.78	55.00	29.27	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Indiana	0.78	18.00	23.99	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Iowa	0.78	2.00	7.92	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Kansas	0.78	2.00	7.28	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Kentucky	0.78	18.00	10.89	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Louisiana	0.78	7.00	11.09	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Maine	0.78	8.00	3.15	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Maryland	0.78	22.00	44.83	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Massachusetts	0.78	21.00	20.73	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Michigan	0.78	14.00	21.95	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Minnesota	0.78	4.00	20.38	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Mississippi	0.78	6.00	7.51	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Missouri	0.78	8.00	22.68	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Montana	0.78	3.00	3.30	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
N. Carolina	0.78	44.00	29.37	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
N. Dakota	0.78	0.00	2.75	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Nebraska	0.78	0.00	13.26	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Nevada	0.78	4.00	6.82	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
New Hamp.	0.78	2.00	3.91	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
New Jersey	0.78	13.00	18.90	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
New Mexico	0.78	12.00	5.70	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
New York	0.78	20.00	47.83	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Ohio	0.78	31.00	26.37	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Oklahoma	0.78	6.00	9.50	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44

Oregon	0.78	5.00	8.87	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Pennsylvania	0.78	72.00	43.59	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Rhode Island	0.78	1.00	2.75	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
S. Carolina	0.78	55.00	27.25	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
S. Dakota	0.78	0.00	2.49	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Tennessee	0.78	20.00	15.09	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Texas	0.78	114.0	97.62	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Utah	0.78	1.00	7.63	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Vermont	0.78	3.00	0.65	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Virginia	0.78	51.00	24.22	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
W. Virginia	0.78	3.00	5.06	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Washington	0.78	29.00	15.34	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Wisconsin	0.78	11.00	13.63	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.28	-1.13	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44
Wyoming	0.78	5.00	2.20	2.49	0.47	2.4x ⁻⁶	5.27	-1.14	-0.30	8.14	3.98	-0.01	-0.44

- Obs. Observed/actual number of ACNA parishes.
- Pred. Number of ACNA parishes predicted by the model.
- Int. Intercept in the regression.
- ECUSA Coefficient on number of Episcopal Church parishes.
- CR Coefficient on the conservative ranking.
- Pop. Coefficient on population according to the 2010 US Census.
- Ord. Coefficient on the number of Anglican Ordinariate parishes.

